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Abstract 
This paper outlines a novel semantics of sentences about taste ('this tastes good'). This 
semantics is based on an ontology of taste occurrences and taste objects and does away with 
implicit experiencers or judges. The semantics generalizes to other impersonal perception 
reports ('this looks red', 'this sounds good' etc) with their ontology of perceptual occurrences 
and perceptual objects, including those with agent-centered situations as the objects of 
perception ('it looks as if it is going to rain'). 
 
Introduction  
This paper is about what I will call impersonal taste reports as in (1) as well as other 
impersonal perception reports such as (2): 
 
(1) a. Chocolate tastes good. 
     b. Chocolate is delicious. 
(2) a. The photo looks good. 
     b. The violin sounds strange. 
     c. The perfume smells as if it was from Guerlain. 
     d. It feels as if it is going to rain. 
  
The standard semantic view about such sentences is that the predicates stand for a subjective 
relation of experience or evaluation between objects and experiencers (judges). This relation 
is generally used to explain the possibility of faultless disagreement about judgments of 
personal taste. It underlies standard contextualist and relativist accounts of the semantics of 
taste sentences, as well as the generic version of the semantics of such sentences proposed in 
Moltmann (2010a, 2012).   
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       This paper will argue for a different semantics of impersonal taste reports and impersonal 
perception reports in general. This semantics is based on a richer ontology of what I will call 
taste occurrences and taste objects and more generally perceptual occurrences and perceptual 
objects. Perceptual occurrences involve a particular experiencer and depend on a particular 
perceptual experience; perceptual objects won’t. The proposed semantics will not invoke 
experiencers or judges as implicit arguments of the perceptual relations expressed by the 
predicates in (1) and (2), let alone as arguments that are syntactically realized by silent 
elements (pro). It thus avoids the problems for implicit experiencer arguments pointed out by 
Collins (2013). 
      The ontological distinction between perceptual occurrences and perceptual objects is 
reflected in semantic differences between impersonal perception verbs and the corresponding 
nouns: impersonal perception verbs (taste, look, sound, smell, feel) take perceptual 
occurrences as arguments; the corresponding nouns take perceptual objects as arguments. 
Thus, the verb taste takes a taste occurrence as an implicit argument, whereas the noun taste 
as in the taste of coffee describes a taste object. Similarly, the nouns in the look of the statue, 
the sound of the violin, the smell of the perfume, and the feel of the fabric describe perceptual 
objects.  
     The ontology of taste occurrences and objective tastes allows dispensing with implicit 
experiencer arguments.  Perceptual occurrences are entities that by nature have an experiencer 
and in their choice of an experiencer show a particular first-person orientation. More 
precisely, impersonal perception verbs show a logophoric behavior, which parallels that of 
generic one: the experiencer is understood either as the speaker, the described attitude bearer, 
or anyone the speaker or described attitude bearer identifies with or simulates (on the generic 
reading).  
    Not just perceptual occurrences have such a first-person orientation, but also the objects of 
perception themselves may, namely agent-centered situations of the sort sentences like (2d) 
are about. 
     In contrast to taste occurrences, taste objects are ‘objective’ or public and do not involve a 
particular individual as experiencer. They are not only  the sorts of things we refer to 
explicitly with NPs like the taste of coffee, but are also involved in the semantics of taste 
adjectives such as delicious or tasty.  Given the semantic involvement of taste objects, 
faultless disagreement of sentences such as (1b) resides in the first-person based evaluation of 
a taste object, rather than the perceptual experience itself.  
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     The paper will first briefly present standard semantic views of sentences about personal 
taste and address semantic differences between impersonal perception verbs and 
corresponding nouns and adjectives. It will then outline the ontology of perceptual 
occurrences and perceptual objects as well the semantics of impersonal perception reports 
with the two sorts of predicates. At the end, it will address the sorts of predictions the present 
approach makes regarding faultless agreement. 
 
1. Standard semantics of sentences expressing personal taste 
 
The general assumption is that taste predicates express a subjective, experiential relation that 
holds between an object (or kind of object) and an agent a, the experiencer or ‘judge’, so that 




(3) a. Coffee tastes good. 
     b. tastes good(coffee, a) 
 
Doubts whether such simple contextualist or relativist analyses can explain the phenomenon 
of faultless disagreement have motivated a more complex analysis of (3a) in terms of first-
person-based genericity, involving simulation (Moltmann 2010a, 2012). A simplified version 
of that analysis is given for (3a) below, for Gn being a suitable generic operator: 
 
(4) a. Everyone as someone the speaker identifies with has a good-tasting experience of  
         coffee. 
     b. λx[Gn y taste good to(coffee, y qua someone x identifies with y)] 
 
Thus, (4a) expresses a property, a property which needs to be self-applied by anyone 
accepting the content of the sentences.  
      Support for the involvement of genericity in taste statements such as (1a) comes from the 
possibility of co-variation of the ‘judge’ with generic one or arbitrary PRO, as in (5a) and (5b) 
respectively: 
                                                            
1 There is another view on which the experiencer or judge is part of the context of assessment, requiring 
reassessment by anyone evaluating the sentences as true or false (McFarlane 2014, Lasersohn 2005). Then, tasty 
denotes a property of objects, with judges acting as parameters of evaluation besides s, as below: 
 





(5) a. When one drinks milk cold, it tastes pro good. 
      b. It is pleasant pro PROarb to sit on the sofa. 
 
In what follows, I will assume that taste sentences such as (3a) display both a generic reading, 
along the lines of (4b), as well as a first-person-oriented non-generic reading on which the 
speaker (or described agent) just conveys her own taste judgment. The latter, given the 
standard assumption about taste predicates and a standard, Lewisian account of de se, would 
be represented as below: 
 
(4) c. λx[tastes good(coffee, x)]. 
 
2. Verbal, adjectival, and nominal taste predicates 
 
2.1. An individual level- stage level distinction among taste predicates 
 
Judgments of taste take different linguistic forms, which go along with somewhat different 
readings. In particular, verbal taste predicates as in (6a) display different readings from 
adjectival taste predicates as in (6b): 
 
(6) a. The coffee tastes delicious. 
     b. The coffee is tasty. 
 
Pearson (this volume) points out that complex taste predicates as in (6a) permit both a generic 
reading and two sorts of non-generic readings, namely a first-person referential reading and 
bound-variable readings. This, for Pearson, is due to the fact that complex taste predicates are 
‘stage-level’. By contrast, simple taste predicates display only a generic reading, which for 
Pearson means that they are ‘individual-level’.  
     Pearson lists various manifestations of the individual-level/stage-level distinction among 
taste predicates.
2
 One of them are the readings of the floated all, which with complex taste 
                                                            
2 Pearson also lists the possibility of adverbial modifiers with stage-level predicates but not with individual-level 
predicates, using the following examples: 
 
(i) a. This tea tastes good in a China cup. 
     b. ??? This tea is tasty in a China cup. 
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predicates gets a reading on which it ranges over situations, as in (7a) but with simple taste 
predicates it only has a reading on which it ranges over the relevant individuals, as in (7b ): 
 
(7) a. Pineapples always taste good. 
     b. Pineapples are always tasty. 
 
The same contrast holds for other impersonal perception verbs and the corresponding 
adjectives. In (8a), always ranges over situations (broadly speaking, including times of the 
day), in (8b) always can range only over churches: 
 
(8) a. English churches look always beautiful; 
    b. English churches are always beautiful. 
 
      Another diagnostics is the acceptability of when-clauses: 
 
(9) a. When the landscape looks beautiful, people photograph it. 
      b. ?? When the landscape is beautiful, people photograph it. 
 
Stage-level predicates can occur in a when-clause, but not individual-level predicates. 
     Yet another diagnostics is the ability for stage-level predicates to occur as small-clause 
predicates of see, as opposed to individual-level predicates: 
 
(9’) a. Emma saw St Paul’s looking beautiful. 
     b. ??? Emma saw St Paul’s beautiful. 
 
     For Pearson, simple taste predicates being ‘individual level’ means that they are always 
generic, involving a generic operator with just scope over the predicate at logical form 
(Chierchia 1995). Thus, whereas (10a) has a first-person referential reading as in (10b) as well 
as a generic reading involving a wide-scope generic operator as in (10c), (11a) requires a 
generic operator taking scope just over the predicate as in (11b): 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
(ii) a. St Pauls’ looks beautiful today. 
     b. ??? St Paul’s is beautiful today. 
 
However, it appears that speakers do not generally agree with the judgments.  
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(10) a. This cake tastes good. 
       b. Gni [this cake tastes good (to) proi] 
       c. [tastes good (to)](this cake, speaker) 
(11) a. This cake is tasty. 
       b. This cake [Gni [is tasty proi]] 
       c. For any entity d, [Gni [is tasty proi](d) = 1 iff x is tasty to everyone in any (relevant)  
            situation. 
 
     There are several issues, however, that arise for this account of simple and complex taste 
predicates. 
      First of all, the account does not give a compositional semantics of complex taste 
predicates like taste good and in particular fails to give justice to the contribution of the 
secondary predicate good in such predicates. In fact, the distinction between complex and 
simple predicates does not align well with the individual-level – stage-level distinction. 
Complex predicates with taste nouns such as has a bitter taste classify as individual-level, not 
stage-level.(Section 4.1.) 
     Second, the account does not explain the stage-level/individual-level correlation with the 
two sorts of predicates. The simple predicates she considers are all adjectives, but adjectives 
themselves are not generally individual-level. Available, apparent, unwell, happy are stage-
level, for example. There are also adjectives that can be used for taste judgments that fail to be 
individual-level, for example terrible and stimulating, predicates that focus on the effect on 
the experiencer. Such adjectives pattern with stage-level predicates given the various 
diagnostics, as indicated below: 
 
(12) a. When I drank it at room temperature, the wine was terrible. 
       b. When I drink coffee in the morning, it is stimulating; when I drink it at night it puts me  
            to sleep. 
 
     Third, the account fails to carry over to the semantics of taste nouns and other nouns 
denoting perceptual objects: the taste of coffee, the look of St Paul’s, the smell of the perfume, 
the sound of the violin display only a sort of generic reading, not a reading relating to a 
particular perceptual occurrence. In the next section, we will discuss in greater the nominal 




     Fourth, the account hinges on treating taste predicates in impersonal taste reports as 
involving an experiencer argument, syntactically realized by a silent element pro. However, 
there is little if any syntactic evidence for judge or experiencer arguments of predicates in 
impersonal taste sentences, as Collins (2013) has argued in relation to criteria such as variable 
binding, obligatory arguments, and ellipsis. This also holds for other predicates of perception 
in impersonal perception reports.  
     Finally, Pearson’s account fails to capture the first-person orientation or logophoric 
character of impersonal perception verbs, an issue I will turn to now. 
 
2.2. The logophoric nature of verbal taste predicates 
 
Verbal taste predicates differ from adjectival ones not only in their stage-level as opposed to 
individual-level behavior, but also in displaying a particular first-person-orientation or 
logophoric character. Pearson (this volume) notices that a first-person covert indexical 
reading is available for verbal taste predicates as in (13a), but not adjectival ones as in (13b), 
an observation that generalizes to all impersonal perception verbs, as in (14): 
 
(13) a. When I am hungry, beans taste good. 
       b. ?? When I am hungry, beans are tasty. 
(14) a. When put in a long vase, a single rose looks nice. 
      b. ?? When put in a long vase, a single rose is nice-looking.  
 
A related observation is that a first-person bound-variable reading with generic one as 
antecedent is available only with verbal taste predicates and not adjectival ones: 
 
(15) a. When one is hungry, beans taste good. 
      b. ?? When one is hungry, beans are tasty. 
 
Impersonal perception verbs need not relate to the speaker, though. In contexts embedded 
under attitude verbs, they will relate to whoever is the described agent. They may do so 
displaying a referential reading (16a) or bound variable reading (16b): 
 
(16) a. John found that the cake tasted good. 




Taste occurrences still relate to the speaker when the taste predicate is not embedded under an 
attitude verb, as in (17): 
 
(17) Everyone is drinking wine that tastes good. 
 
The same generalization holds for impersonal perception verbs of other perceptual modes, 
illustrated by the following contrast: 
 
(18) a. Everyone who looked at the picture from the entrance was angry that the picture did  
            not look good. 
       b. Everyone stood next to a picture that did not look good.  
 
With respect to the perceptual occurrences they describe, impersonal perception verbs thus 
behave like logophoric pronouns, and also generic one, in relating to the speaker or else 
whoever is the bearer of the relevant described attitude,. Impersonal perception verbs differ in 
that respect from ordinary perception verbs (see, hear etc), which fail to display such 
logophoricity. Capturing the latter is an important condition for an adequate semantics of 
impersonal perception verbs. 
 
3. Taste occurrences and other perceptual occurrences 
 
3.1. The linguistic form of impersonal verbal perceptual reports 
 
On the present view, taste verbs denote relations between entities and taste occurrences, and 
adjectival taste predicates relations between entities and taste objects. Neither involves 
experiencers as arguments. That is because the ontology of taste objects and other perceptual 
objects permits dispensing with experiencer arguments. Perceptual occurrences are dependent 
on or directed toward a particular experiencer. If impersonal verbs of perception denote 
relations between entities and perceptual occurrences, they won’t require experiencer 
arguments for semantic reasons. By contrast, perceptual objects do not depend on particular 
experiencers. If adjectival taste predicates denote relations between entities and taste objects, 




     If impersonal perception predicates denote relations between entities and perceptual 
occurrences or perceptual objects, such as tastes, looks, sounds, and smells, this permits a 
compositional semantics of complex predicates such as taste good or look nice. But first a few 
remarks are in order about such predicates. 
      Impersonal perceptual reports with a verbal predicate are of the form DP V XP, where V 
is an impersonal perception verb (look, sound, smell) and XP an obligatory adverbial modifier 
or secondary predicate. Though obligatory, the secondary predicate occupies the very same 
position as other adverbial modifiers. The secondary predicate can be any expression that can 
also act as an adverbial. On the present view, it always expresses a property to be predicated 
of the perceptual occurrence. Impersonal perception reports then will involve existential 
quantification over perceptual occurrences and predication of the secondary predicate of the 
perceptual occurrences. For an impersonal taste report such as (19a) this is given in (19b):       
 
(19) a. The cake tastes good.  
        b. d(taste(the cake, d) & good(d)) 
 
In (19b), no use was made of event arguments. That is because the issue of event arguments is 
rather independent of the argument in favor of perceptual occurrences and perceptual objects.  
     The sort of analysis in (19b) will also be the semantics impersonal perceptual reports of 
other perceptual modes. 
     The generic reading of verbal impersonal perceptual reports does not involve a distinct 
entity, but rather a generic operator, which one may assume, ranges just over situations 
suitably restricted. Thus, on the generic reading, the logical form of (19a) will be:  
 
(19) c. Gn s d(tastes(the cake, d) & goods(d)) 
 
There is an issue whether generically quantified sentences of this sort require actual instances. 




(20) I'm sure the garden looks beautiful today, since it's such a nice day, so it's a shame  
       they've closed off the place to all visitors, so that no one can see it. 
                                                            





The distinction between perceptual occurrences and perceptual objects is of course compatible 
with the generic operator not requiring actual instances. 
    (19a) actually has two readings (Jackson 1977, Rudolph, this volume): a phenomenal 
reading on which good applies to the appearance, the taste occurrence, and a non-phenomenal 
reading on which it applies to the stimulus. On the second reading, the taste occurrence 
indicates that the cake is good, ratherthan qualifying the taste as such. I will not discuss the 
second reading in greater detail in this paper, but just suggest an ontological account of the 
two readings. Whereas on the first reading, the secondary predicate applies to the taste 
occurrence itself, on the second reading it applies to the epistemic modal object generated by 
the taste occurrence.
4
 Unlike a taste occurrence, a modal object has truth or satisfactions, and 
their content may include the content of various sentences (or small clauses). The modal 
object generated by a taste object d then supports the small clause [the cake good] (that is, the 
content of [the cake good] is part of the content of m) just in case d is evidence for the truth of 
[the cake good]. Given this proposal, the ambiguity between the phenomenal and the non-
phenomenal reading is traced to the semantics of impersonal perception verbs, more precisely, 
the ontology that goes along with them, that is, the ontology of perceptual occurrences and the 
modal objects they generate. 
     The secondary predicate of impersonal perception reports may also be an as if-clause, an 





(21) a. John walks as if he was drunk. 
       b. John behaves like he was being hunted. 
(22) a. This looks / tastes / smells / sounds as though it was very old. 
       b. The landscape looks like it had not rained for weeks. 
 
                                                            
4 For more on modal objects see Moltmann (2017, 2018), where modal objects are taken to have a truthmaker-
based content. Modal objects have been taken to play a central role in the semantics of modal sentences within 
truthmaker semantics, more precisely object-based truthmaker semantics. 
 
5 As if-clauses also permit co-variation of generic one with the experiencer of the described perceptual 
occurrences: 
 




The semantics of as if-clauses and like-clauses is more complex of course (see Bledin/Srinivas 
to appear for a recent discussion and possible-worlds-based analysis). The ontology of 
perceptual occurrences promises a new analysis along the following lines, where X is a 
definite NP and f is a function mapping the set [S] of situations described by the sentence S to 
a matching kind of perceptual occurrences: 
 
(23) a. X looks as if S. 
       b. For a perceptual occurrence d, look([X], d) and d is similar to the kind of perceptual  
            occurrence that matches the situational content of S. 
       c. d(look([X], d) & d  f([S],[X], look) 
 
How the relation of a set of situation to a kind of perceptual occurrences is to be understood 
needs to be elaborated, of course. But, as it is marginal to the main theme of this paper, this 
can be left for another occasion. Note that (23b) captures only the non-generic reading of 





3.2. The nature of taste occurrences 
 
Taste occurrences are concrete qualities borne by taste experiences. Taste occurrences are 
thus dependent on the experience and its experiencer. The identity and existence of taste 
occurrences obviously depends on the agent. If I did not taste the coffee, the coffee did not 
taste good to me. The properties of taste occurrences are different though from the experience 
itself. The experience, for example, has temporal properties, but the taste occurrence won’t. A 
taste experience can occur unintentionally or by mistake, but this is not what one would 
attribute to the taste occurrence. The taste occurrence only has qualitative properties, such as 
being sour, bitter, or sweet, which one would not attribute to the taste experience itself.  
       It is not obvious how exactly the relation between a taste occurrence and a taste 
experience should be conceived, and how their relation should possibly be reflected in the 
semantics of impersonal taste sentences. The relation might possibly be conceived as one 
                                                            
6 Thus, McGrath (p.c.) points out the potential truth of (i), when the speaker knows that no one is looking at the 
house now: 
 




between and event and its result, as is suggested by German resultative morphology for taste 
occurrences (schmecken – to taste, Geschmack – taste).
7
  In this paper, I will set aside taste 
experiences and take impersonal taste predicates to only take a taste occurrence as an 
argument.   
    Other perceptual modes likewise come with perceptual occurrences besides perceptual 
experiences. Subjective looks are qualities borne by visual experiences, sound occurrences are 
qualities borne by auditory experiences, smell occurrences are qualities borne by olfactory 
experiences. Again, the properties of the occurrences are obviously different from those of the 
experiences.  
    (20) does not yet capture all there is to the semantics of impersonal perception verbs. In 
particular, it does not account for [1] the logophoric character of impersonal perception verbs 
and  [2] the possibility of generic readings, and in particular covariation with generic one. 
   Impersonal perception verbs describe perceptual occurrences that relate either to the speaker 
or in contexts embedded under attitude verbs, the attitude bearer. It thus relates to a context 
that is centered on an intentional agent and can be shifted under embedding under attitude 
verbs. In this paper, I will make use only of very basic, familiar tools of semantic analysis, 
leaving a possibly more accurate semantic analysis of the phenomenon to a future occasion. I 
will assume that sentences are evaluated with respect to two contexts: a context u, the 
utterance context, and a context c, the context of evaluation that may be shifted for sentences 
embedded under attitude verbs. Both contexts, for present purposes, are identified with a 
triple consisting of a situation or world s, a time t, and an agent a. Thus, for a context c sc will 
be the situation in c, tc the time in c, and ac the agent in c.  Attitude reports shift the context c 
to one in which the agent is the described attitude holder, as indicated below for believe, 
making use, for present purposes, of a Hintikka-style semantics of belief reports:  
 
(24) For contexts u and c, and an individual a’, 
        [believe that S ]
u,c
(a’) = 1 iff for all s’, s’ Rbelieve,ac sc  [S]
u, c’
 = 1, where c’ is like c except  
        that sc = s’ and ac = a’. 
 
                                                            
7 If taste occurrences are regarded as results of taste experiences, this would match the view that judgments are 
results of acts of judging and conclusions results of acts of concluding (Moltmann 2017). Given such a view, the 
logical form of (19a) would be as below: 
 




Let us take H to be the relation of ‘having’ or bearerhood that holds between an agent and a 
perceptual occurrence. Then impersonal perception verbs will be subject to the following 
condition: 
 
(25) Logophoric condition on impersonal perception verbs 
        For an impersonal verb of perception V, 
        for contexts u and c, [V]
u,c
 = { x | d (<x, d>   [V]
u, c
 & H(d, ac))} 
 
(19a) will now have the truth conditions below: 
 
(26) [the cake taste good]
u,c 
= 1 iff  d( ([the cake]
u,c
, d)  [tastes]
u,c 
& H(d, ac) &  




   Let us then turn to the generic reading of impersonal perception reports as well as the 
semantics of generic one. I will assume that on the generic reading, impersonal perception 
reports will involve a generic operator Gn which will shift not only the situation sc of the 
context of evaluation c, but also the agent ac in c, as below, where R is a suitable relation 
restricting the situations of evaluation: 
 
(27) The generic reading of impersonal perception reports 
        For an impersonal perception verb V, a definite NP Y, and a modifier X,  
        [Gn  Y V X]
u, c
 = 1 iff for all situations s’ and individuals a such that s’ R sc, there is a  
        perceptual occurrence d such that <[Y], d>  [V]
u, c’ 
& d  [X]
u, c’
, where c’ is like c,  
        except that sc = s’ and ac = the agent in s’.   
 
     Generic one involves the same type of logophoricity as impersonal perception verbs, 
which means that generic-one sentences will relate to the gent of the shiftable context c. On 
my previous account (Moltmann 2006, 2010b), generic one ranges over individuals (in the 
relevant group) qua individuals the speaker identifies with or simulates. For present purposes, 
I will adopt that account, but in addition I will assume that generic one goes along with a 
change in the context c, shifting the speaker (or attitude bearer) in c to the individuals generic 




(28) The semantics of generic one 
        [one VP]
u, c
 = 1 iff for all a’, a’ [qua ac I a’]   [VP]
u, c’
, where c’ is like c except that  
         ac’  = a’.  
 
Here I is the relation of identification or simulation, which ensures that with generic one a 
predicate is applied to an individual a’ on the basis of the speaker putting herself into the 
shoes of a’ - or simulating a’ (Moltmann 2006, 2010b). 
        Covariation of generic one with the experiencer associated with an impersonal 
perception verb is made possible through the presence of a single generic operator in the 
sentence, an operator that will trigger a shift of the context c to contexts c’ such that the 
agents of the contexts c’ are the individuals the generic operator ranges over. This is indicated 
for conditionals below (using a very simplified semantics): 
 
(29) For contexts u and c, a definite NP Y, an impersonal perception verb V, and  
         a modifier X, 
        [If one VP, then Y V X]
u,c
 = 1 iff: for all a’, if a’ [qua ac I a’]  [VP]
u, c’
, then  
        d (<[Y], d>   [V]
u,c’
 & d  [X]
u, c’
), where is c’ is like c except that ac’= a’. 
   
    The same analyses apply to impersonal perception verbs of other modes. The sentences 
below will be about visual, auditory; olfactory; and tactile occurrences with the same first 
personal orientation or logophoric status as the taste occurrences described by the verb taste: 
 
(30) a. When I saw the picture this morning, it looked great. 
       b. When I listened to it this morning, the piano sounded good. 
       c. When I touched the fabric this morning, it felt good. 
 
Impersonal verbs of perception thus describe simple relations between entities and perceptual 
occurrences, and it is their logophoric status that restrict those perceptual occurrences to those 
whose experiencers are the ‘agents’ of the current contexts of evaluation. 
 
4. Taste objects and other perceptual objects 
 




The noun taste enables reference to a taste object, an entity that is independent of particular 
taste experiences and in particular does not depend on a particular experiencer. Nominal taste 
predicates in the constructions below share the same apparent generic reading of adjectival 
taste predicates, as opposed to verbal predicates. That is, (29a) and (29b) only have the 
reading of (29c), not of (29d): 
 
(29) a. The coffee has a good taste. 
       b. The taste of the coffee is good. 
       c. The coffee is tasty. 
       d. The coffee tastes good. 
 
The application of relevant diagnostics supports that, for example the acceptability of when- 
clause: 
 
(30) a. When I am really hungry, plain rice tastes good. 
       b. ?? When I am really hungry, plain rice is tasty. 
       c. ?? When I am really hunry, the taste of plain rice is good. 
 
The nominal constructions displays a reading on which good does not evaluate a particular 
tasting experience or rather taste occurrence, but the taste of the coffee / plain rice as 
something objectual or public. This is obvious from the way epistemic predicates apply. The 
taste of coffee is treated an object of knowledge, recognition, and differentiation: 
 
(31) a. Mary knows the taste of coffee. 
       b. Bill recognizes the taste of cigarettes. 
       c. Bill cannot distinguish the taste of coffee from the taste of chocolate. 
 
Similarly, there are nouns for objects of other perceptual modes, such as looks, sounds, 
smells, which also provide objects of knowledge: 
 




      Apart from the semantics of nouns for perceptual objects and of impersonal perception 
reports, looks as entities have been motivated for purely philosophical reasons as well, namely 
for perceptual justification. Entities that are looks, McGrath (2017, 2018) has argued, act as 
the reasons for perceptual beliefs  
      There are actually two uses of nouns for tastes and other perceptual objects that need to be 
distinguished: a relational use and a nonrelational use. The relational use is restricted to 
reference to taste objects, as in (33a), whereas the non-relational use serves for reference to 




(33) a. I know the taste of coffee. 
       b. I don’t know this taste. 
       c. I have never experienced this taste. 
. 
Only the construction the taste of applies to an entity mapping it to the ‘objective’ taste object 
that is associated with it.  
      For a given entity there may not be single perceptual object for a particular perceptual 
mode, but rather a distinction may have to be made between viewpoint-relative looks and 
what I will call ‘overall looks’ (‘looks in the round’) (McGrath 2021). The relational noun 
look can be used for both, (34a) and (34b) illustrate: 
 
(34) a. The statue has different looks, depending on the light and where one stands. 
       b. I like the look of the statue. 
 
     With nominal taste predicates, it depends on the nature of the property expressed by the 
adjective whether faultless agreement arises: evaluative predicates like good give rise to 
faultless agreement, as is possible in (35); predicates like bitter as in (36) don’t, an issue I will 
come back to in Section 6: 
 
(35) a. Coffee has a good taste. 
                                                            
8 A similar distinction holds for the noun color (Moltmann 2013). (ia) has a reading involving reference to kinds 
of color occurrences, which is unavailable in (ib): 
 
(i) a. I have never seen this color. 
    b. ? I have never seen the color of this car. 
 
In (ib) color of is used relationally, referring to the color that pertains to a particular object. 
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        b. The taste of coffee is good. 
(36) a. Coffee has a bitter taste. 
       b. The taste of the coffee is bitter. 
 
       In this paper, I will not give a full ontological account of taste objects and other 
perceptual objects. Rather it will have to suffice to characterize them in terms of some of their 
linguistically reflected properties.
9
 First of all, tastes are ontologically dependent on an entity, 
and thus they cannot be conceived as properties. But tastes might be conceived as 
particularized properties, more precisely, particularized response-dependent properties. The 
entities on which a taste depends may inherit properties from the taste. Coffee is bitter 
because its taste is bitter, for example. But this does not hold for all properties. The taste of 
the wine may be unusual while the wine is not unusual.  Objective tastes are to be 
distinguished from tastes that pertain to particular taste experiences, that is, ‘taste 
occurrences’. A taste object might be construed as a kind of taste occurrence, that is, a kind 
whose instances are particular taste occurrences. However, taste objects do not appear to 
require actual instances, an intuition that is even clearer with related entities such as looks, as 
we will see.  
 
4.2. The semantics of nominal and adjectival taste predicates 
 
Tastes as entities and the distinction between taste occurrences and taste objects allow for a 
straightforward semantics of verbal and nominal taste predicates. Verbs like taste take 
particular taste occurrences as arguments, whereas the relational noun taste (of) takes taste 
objects as arguments. Thus the logical form of (37a) will be as in (37b), where the relational 
noun taste is taken to denote a function from entities to taste objects: 
 
(37) a. The taste of the coffee is good. 
        b. good(taste(the coffee)) 
 
The individual-level status of taste adjective such as tasty can now be attributed to the implicit 
presence of taste objects, along the lines of the following equivalence: 
                                                            
9 In fact, a semanticist should not have to decide how tastes are to be conceived ultimately, this rather is a matter 
for the philosopher of mind or metaphysician to decide. See the discussion of the distinction between 
foundational and naïve or descriptive metaphysics (which comprises natural language ontology) in Fine (2017) 




(38) tasty(the coffee) iff good(taste(the coffee)) 
 
This carries over to other perceptual relational nouns (smell, sound, feel) and perceptual 
adjectives. 
      The distinction between taste occurrences and taste objects generalizes to other modes of 
perception, though with different extents to which the objects are experience-dependent.  
With sounds, the distinction between experience-dependence and object-dependence is 
particularly intuitive. One may hear a particular sound and one may hear / know / recognize 
the sound of a particular flute. Verbal taste predicates display an experience-dependent 
reading, as in (39a); relational uses of nouns display an object-dependent reading, as in (39a, 
b): 
 
(39) a. This flute sounds unusual. 
       b. This flute has an unusual sound.  
       c. The sound of the flute is unusual. 
 
The sound of a flute clearly is independent of a particular experience. It is less obvious that 
sounds are dependent on the object that produces them. Intuitively, the very same sound could 
have been produced by a different flute. Moreover, objects on which sounds depend do not 
generally inherit properties from the sounds.  Thus, evaluative predicates when applied to 
musical instruments generally evaluate their physical shape, not their sounds. Deep cannot be 
applied to a contrabass even if the sound of it is deep, and deep applies to voices, not to the 
people that make the sounds. 
      Both predicates give rise to faultless disagreement with evaluative adjectives (See Section 
6): 
 
(40) a. This flute sounds nice. 
       b. This flute has a nice sound. 
       c. The sound of the flute is nice. 
 
     Smells display the very same pattern, allowing for verbal and nominal predicates, as in 




(41) a. The perfume smells fruity. 
        b. The perfume has a fruity smell.  
(42) a. The perfume smells nice. 
       b. The perfume has a nice smell. 
 
Properties of smells are inherited by entities only if the entities are of the very same nature 
(perfumes). Whereas properties of looks (properties of shape, size) are inherited from the 
entities that have the looks, properties of sounds, smells, tastes are not inherited from the 
entities that have them.    
 
4.3. The ontology of perceptual objects 
 
What is the ontological status of perceptual objects? Do they depend on experiences or are 
they mind-independent?  McGrath (2017, 2021), who argued that looks play a role both in 
perceptual justification and in the semantics of looks reports, argues against subjectivist and 
dispositionalist accounts of looks. First of all, looks do not require experiences by agents; they 
are ‘public’ entities. This holds both for viewpoint-relative looks and overall looks.
10
 
Linguistically, this reflected in the acceptability of the sentences below: 
 
(43) a. The statue would look the same even if no one had looked at it. 
       b. The statue would have the same looks from the different angles even if no one had  
            looked at it. 
 
McGrath also argues against dispositionalist accounts of looks for ontological reasons: we do 
not ‘see’ or ‘recognize’ dispositions when we see or recognize a look. Ontologically, McGrath 
(2018) proposes to identify sets of sensible properties. An alternative that one might pursue is 
to take them to be kinds of (collections of) response-dependent tropes. Both views, though, 
still have to elaborate the distinction between view-point-relative and overall looks.
11
 
                                                            
10 McGrath (2018) distinguishes those from ‘subjective looks’, which would fall under perceptual occurrences in 
the present sense. 
 
11 McGrath (2021) proposes that view-point-relative looks: be conceived as properties of presenting light of a 
certain character to the viewpoint, where looks on the round (overall looks) are what it is about an object that 
grounds the possibilities of its viewpoint-relative looks. This account obviously does not carry over to perceptual 




     To what extent can the arguments for experience-independence be generalized to 
perceptual objects of other modes?  The contrasts below indicate that they apply also to taste 
objects, as opposed to taste occurrences, at least with non-evaluative predicates: 
 
(44) a. ? If one can no longer drink coffee, coffee can no longer taste bitter. 
       b. If one can no longer drink coffee, coffee would still have a bitter taste. 
(45) a. ? If one can no longer drink coffee, coffee can no longer taste good. 
        b. (?) If one can no longer drink coffee, coffee would still have a good taste. 
 
The arguments do not carry over to all perceptual objects, though, in particular not those that 
can hardly be separated from the experience itself, such as physical and emotional feelings (as 
in the massage feels great, the praise felt good).
12
  Feelings come with verbal predicates 
describing occurrences as well as nominal predicates describing feelings as objectual, ‘public’ 
entities. The latter, again, are able to act as objects of knowledge: 
 
 (46) a. I don’t know what it feels like to be praised by everyone. 
        b. I know the pleasure of good company. 
 
That ‘feelings’ can hardly be dissociated from the experiences appears to be reflected 
linguistically, namely in the choice of the light verb with the nominal construction. Whereas 
tastes, looks, smells, and sounds are selected by the light verb have, feelings are selected by 
the light verb give: 
 
(47) a. This thing has / ?? gives a nice taste / look / smell / sound. 
       b. The massage gives / ??? has a strange feeling. 
 
Thus, at least some perceptual objects are individuated on the basis of experiences 
themselves.  
 
5. Implicit agent-centered situations as objects of perception 
                                                            
12  Feeling of this sort need to be distinguished from tactile feels, which are as experience-independent as tastes, 
looks and sounds: 
 
(i) a. The fabric feels rough 





Not only individuals or kinds of them may serve as referents of the subject of impersonal 
perceptual reports. The very same types of impersonal perception reports allow for what I will 
call agent-centered situations as the objects of perception. These are perceptual reports with 




(48) a. It is nice / hot / dark here. 
        b. It smells nice here. 
(49) a. It looks like it is going to rain. 
        b. It sounds like there will be a tempest. 
        c. It smells like there is a fire nearby. 
        d. It felt as if it was going to rain. 
 
In (48a, b), here obviously gives the speaker’s location. Other location modifiers are possible 
only if they specify the location of the speaker (or described attitude bearer) at another time as 






(50) a. It was nice in Germany.  
       b. It will be interesting in Beijing.  
(51) There it looked like it was going to rain. 
(52) It is pleasant in Paris in spring. 
 
                                                            
13 Not all perception verbs that can occur in impersonal perception reports allow for agent-centered situations. 
German wirken ‘appear’, for example, cannot: 
 
(i) a. Hans wirkt muede. 
         ‘Hans appears tired.’ 
    b. Hans wirkt, als haette er nicht geschlafen. 
        ‘John appears as if he had not slept.’ 
    c. * Es wirkt, als wuerde es regnen. 
         ‘It appears as if it was going to rain.’ 
 
14 Sentences reporting weather (it is raining) belong to the same syntactic class; though they are less directly 
related to perception. 
 
15 (50a), (50b) and (51) also have a generic reading on which they do not require the speaker’s (or anyone’s) 




With agent-centered situations, the copula be can take the place of the perception verb, as in 
the first stanza of the most famous German romantic poem: 
 
(53) Es war, als hätt’ der Himmel die Erde still geküßt, daß sie im Blütenschimmer von ihm  
        nun träumen müßt'. (Josef von Eichendorff Mondnacht ‘Moonlight’) 
        ‘It was as though Heaven had softly kissed the Earth, so that she in a gleam of blossom  
       had only to dream of him. (translation Richard Stokes) 
 
The agent-centered situations appear to have the very same ‘logophoric’ status as the 
perceptual occurrences of impersonal perception verbs. In contexts embedded under attitude 
verbs with a different agent, the situation will be centered on the other agent, as in (54a); but 
such a shift is not available without attitude verb, as in (54b), where pleasant can relate only 
to the speaker: 
 
(54) a. John was happy that it was so pleasant in Germany. 
       b. John met me while it was still so pleasant in Berlin.  
 
Agent-centered situations may also figure in generic-one sentences. Below the when-clauses 
restrict the agent-centered situations the implicit generic quantifier ranges over and that are 
also the object evaluation for the main clause: 
 
(55) a. It is unbearable when one has just lost a parent. 
        b. It is like that when one is completely unprepared. 
 
The agent-centered situations as the entities that impersonal perception reports are about 
relate to the shiftable context c, just like the perceptual occurrences described by impersonal 
perception verbs. For the semantics of impersonal perception reports with agent-centered 
situations, I will assume, as is plausible, that it in subject position stands for the relevant 
agent-centered situation. Then the semantics in a first approximation will be as follows: 
 
(56) Semantics of impersonal perception reports with agent-centered situations 
        For an impersonal perception verb V, a modifier X, and contexts u and c,  
        [It V X]
u,c
  = 1 iff   d(<[it]
u,c
 , d>  [V]
u,c




 is a situation  




     There are two further observations to be made about impersonal perception reports with 
agent-centered situations. 
     First, there are cases in which the situation an (independent) impersonal perception 
sentence is about is in fact not the speaker-centered situation, but a contextually relevant one 
that one the speaker projects herself onto. These are examples: 
 
(57) a. It looks like the TV presenter is distracted. 
       b. It sounds like you are exhausted. 
       c. There it looks like no one had cleaned up. 
 
Putting oneself in another situation (simulating being in the center of another situation) is an 
option that is similarly available with generic one and impersonal verbal taste reports, when a 
speaker may project herself onto another agent (This tastes good when speaking to a baby). 
      Second, with verbs like seem and look the agent-centered situations may also be epistemic 
situations, constituted by the evidence that presents itself in the context: 
 
(58) a. It seems as if there is no solution to the problem. 
        b. It looks as if John is innocent. 
 
Seem and look as impersonal epistemic verbs belong to the same class as impersonal 
perception verbs, though of course they will not take perceptual occurrences as arguments 
 
6. Faultless disagreement with impersonal perception reports 
 
Sentences expressing judgments of personal taste are at the center of a recent philosophical 
debate about faultless disagreement, the possibility for two agents maintaining (59a) and 
(59b) respectively being both right: 
 
(59) a. Olives are tasty. 
       b. Olives are not tasty. 
 
Given my previous views, faultless disagreement is due to the sentence expressing first-




(60)  λx[Gn y taste good to(olives, y qua someone x simulates)] 
 
This is still a relativist account since the property in (60) needs to be self-applied by anyone 
accepting the content of the sentences. However, unlike standard relativist accounts, it is first-
person genericity that is crucial for explaining faultless disagreement. What matters for 
agreement or disagreement about taste judgments is whether agents can project themselves 
onto (or simulate) the same range of people on the basis of their first-person experience (or 
simulated experience). Two agents disagree about the taste judgments due to their ability or 
inability to attribute the taste judgment to anyone in the group on the basis of such 
identification.  
    Assuming first-person genericity to be the grounds for faultless disagreement, the present 
semantics of impersonal perception reports makes certain predictions as to when it will arise. 
First of all, the genericity of taste sentences with adjectival or nominal predicates is due to a 
taste object, not first person-based genericity. This means that with non-evaluative predicates 
such as bitter, sweet, unusual no faultless disagreement should arise, which appears to be 
correct: 
 
(61) a. The taste of coffee is bitter. 
        b. This coffee is bitter. 
 
However, a taste object may itself be subject of first-person based genericity, which arguably 
is part of the lexical meaning of evaluative predicates such as delicious or mediocre. With 
evaluative predicates, faultless disagreement clearly does arise: 
 
(62) a. The taste of coffee is delicious. 
        b. Coffee is delicious. 
 
     A different prediction is made for verbal taste predicates. The genericity of verbal taste 
predicates is first-person-based genericity (even if the present proposal gives a more complex 
semantics of generic one, explicitly involving simulation). Thus verbal taste predicates should 
always give rise to faultless disagreement, which seems to accord with intuitions: 
 
(63) a. This drink tastes bitter. 
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       b. The cake tastes unusual.  
 
The same contrast appears to hold for other perceptual predicates: 
 
(64) a. The perfume smells fruity. 
       b. The smell of the perfume is fruity. 
 




This paper has argued for a novel semantics of impersonal perceptual reports based on an 
ontology of perceptual occurrences and perceptual objects. Perceptual occurrences display the 
same sort of ‘logophoric’ first-person orientation as generic one, as do agent-centered 
situations as the objects of perception in impersonal perception reports with dummy subjects. 
‘Objective’ perceptual objects are the source of genericity of perceptual reports with nominal 
or adjectival predicates, which is thus a distinct form of genericity from the first-person-based 
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